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PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMINALS
P. F. Gault
The author is Commerce Counsel of the Chicago and North Western
-Railway. He served as an officer of Field Artillery and in the Office of
the Judge Advocate General, Regular Army, his last commission being
Lt. Colonel, and is a member of the Committee on Military and Naval
Law, American Bar Association. He maintains that the proposed Neuremburg trials are ill conceived and without legal foundation, and those
accused of actual war crimes should be tried by military commissions
under the law and customs of war.-EDITOR.

Wars are made by politicians and diplomats and fought by

.soldiers. There is a spirit abroad suggesting that civilians may
influence the prosecution of so-called war criminals with the
result that soldiers who have served their country will be made
the object of vengeance when subjected to the control and
power of a triumphant state.
First of all, it should be noted that the law and customs
of war developed over a long period of years and, up to the
present time at least, with increasing concern for humane objectives, provide ample and unquestioned precedents for punishing commonly recognized war crimes, e.g., mistreatment of
prisoners of war, assassination of soldiers by civilians of an
enemy country, espionage, sabotage, and irregular or guerrilla
warfare. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1.
For the orderly trial and punishment of war crimes as defined
by established and commonly accepted law the army needs
neither advice nor instruction from civilians. A case in point
is the recent trial of four German civilians accused and found
guilty of beating to death a United States aviator forced down
on German soil. All were hanged with the exception of one
and in his case the Commanding General, in the exercise of
his authority and discretion, reduced the sentence to life imprisonment. Similar convictions frequently are reported in
the press.
There was a time in the history of mankind when soldiers
of a beaten army were put to the sword or held in bondage and
their leaders chained to the chariots of the conquering commanders to make a Roman holiday. These practices passed
with the advance of civilization - at least until recently, perhaps - and now are found only among savage tribes.
Early last June a report to the President on Trials of War
Criminals was made public. The report cites no precedents
and fails to reveal how it reconciles its proposals and conclusions with the law and customs of war and principles of international law as heretofore established and applied. Its concepts
.are directly violative of the fundamental principles which the
American Bar Association's Committee on Prosecution of War
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Criminals, composed of distinguished international lawyers, has
found should govern these prosecutions, i.e., (1) the objective
is not revenge but vindication of the processes of organized
justice; (2) anything which may fairly be denounced as legislation after the event must be excluded; and (8) there is no
rule of international law making an enemy person criminally
responsible to the military or civil courts of other countries for
acts committed within his -own territory and against his own
fellow nationals.
Concerning the fixation of ex post facto criminal standards,
the rule is well stated in U. S. .v. Hudson and Goodwin, 7
Cranch. 32, decided in 1812:
"* * * the legislative authority of the Union must first make an aet a

crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the court that shall have
jurisdiction of the offence * *

*"

This principle was accorded recognition in the majority opinion of Justice Jackson in Cramer v. United States in-U. S.-,
89 L. Ed. 937, 962, wherein a judgment of conviction for treason against the United States was reversed, citing Ex Parte
Bollman and Swartout, 4 Cranch 75. In the Bollman and
Swartout case Chief Justice Marshall, speaking of treason,
which, like so-called war crimes, generates passion and desire
for vengeance, said (p. 127) :
"*

* * punishment in such cases should be ordained by general laws,

formed upon deliberation, under the influence of no resentments, and
without knowing on whom they are to operate * * *."
This is the doctrine advocated by the United States as a rule
of international as well as of municipal law, at least until the
above mentioned report was presented to the President. It
was insistently urged by the American Members of the Commission of Responsibilities of the Paris Peace Conference after
World War I, and no contrary precedent was established after
that war.
A victorious state has the power to punish a defeated nation
by exacting indemnities or otherwise and international law
does not prevent such exactions solely as the penalty of defeat
without regard to moral questions possibly present. But to
deprive individuals of liberty or life is another matter and
ought to and does rest upon different concepts of law.
The report to the President apparently would create a
standard of individual conduct premised upon whether the
state to which he owed allegiance was believed engaged in acts
of aggression and in violation of treaties.
International law in its present state affords no support for
the report's thesis of individual criminal responsibility for acts
other than those recognized by the law and customs of war.
History - even recent history - is full of acts of aggression
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and violation of solemn treatiest by states and yet, until the
above mentioned report was published, there has been no
serious suggestion of individual criminal responsibility. It happens that only recently one of the allied nations has been involved in several such enterprises, e.g., eastern Poland
(contemporaneous with Hitler's invasion of Poland), Finland,
and the Baltic Republics, and, so far as made public, the
United States has not as yet recognized the change in status of
the last named or of what once was eastern Poland.
It is fair to say that the report creates the impression that its
doctrine in this regard is based solely on the circumstance
whether aggression succeeds or fails, a rather unsatisfactory
standard when life and liberty of individuals are in issue.
It is plain that international law affords no sanction for
prosecuting Germans for alleged crimes against other Germans
before the war. Moreover, if an individual's life or liberty is
to be taken, it would seem that his conduct should be measured
by a standard having universal application. It does not take a
long memory to recall that, after control of one of the allied
states was seized by those now in power, its former ruler and
his helpless famiily were cruelly destroyed, and it is notorious
that atrocities, concentration camps, purges, forced labor, banishment to Siberia, mass transfers of peoples, and kindred
practices are associated with the group presently ruling that
great country. It is common knowledge that such practices
are characteristic of any totalitarian regime and essential instruments in keeping it in power.
A recent press inquiry directed to the American chief prosecutor of war crimes reportedly was answered by the quip that
appeals of those convicted would be "to history," thus suggesting that review of the record or approval of sentence would not
be required. Such a concept of procedure is in conflict with
fundamental principles governing military courts, cf. A.W. 46,
Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1.
For prosecution of war crimes under the law and customs of
war there is no occasion to invent ex post facto legal standards
or to create an international kangaroo court.
A current newspaper account states that war criminals are
likely to be given a mass trial. Such procedure is suggestive
of Soviet jurisprudence and trial technique. It is violative of
all the fundamental legal concepts of this country. If it were
not such a serious matter the proposal might well be dismissed
lightly as suggestive of some super-colossal Hollywood stunt.
The plan of procedure outlined in the report will create
dangerous precedents tending to place on the shoulders of the
military men responsibility for the mistakes or misdeeds of the
government to which they must render allegiance. After sur-
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viving the perils of battle in fighting for their country they
would still be confronted with the necessity of fighting for life
and liberty before a hostile court.
It is always within the power of the conqueror to deal with
the defeated as the- aggressor. News reports assert that it is
contemplated to execute or imprison the members of the German General staff and to obliterate the Junker class said to
produce largely the officers of the German permanent military
establishment. On that theory of law, should the United States
ever lose a major war - and God forbid - graduates of West
Point and of the military colleges and schools, officers of the
Regular Army, National Guard and the Reserve Corps - and
manifestly the General Staff and especially the War Plans
Division, would be particularly vulnerable - and corresponding Naval personnel would be in danger of being imprisoned
or executed as war criminals.
Measured by established legal standards, the program outlined by the report is arbitrary, amounts to legislation after
the event, exhibits a spirit of revenge rather than the vindication of established law and justice, and in addition would tend
to create precedents adding to the hazards of those who must
fight our country's battles.

